Introduction
Uganda traces the infiltration of Spyware back to 2011 following the presidential elections, and the proliferation of this technology poses a significant threat to civic space and feminist organising in Uganda. Spyware also known as malicious software is designed to infiltrate and monitor devices without the user’s consent, undermining the fundamental rights to privacy, freedom of expression, and association. Its deployment has far-reaching consequences for activists, journalists, and particularly feminist groups advocating for gender equality and women’s rights. These interventions are critically important, but may not consider issues such as human rights, data protection, transparency and accountability, which have been overlooked in responses to previous pandemics.
On July 17, 2024, during DataFest Africa in Nairobi, WOUGNET held a workshop titled “The impact of spyware on civic space and feminist organising in Uganda.” The panel featured prominent voices from across East Africa and beyond, including Angela Minayo, an Advocate of the High Court of Kenya who also serves as the Digital Rights and Policy Programs Officer at Article19 Eastern Africa; Esther Nyapendi, a Technical Support Officer at Women Of Uganda Network (WOUGNET); Tabitha Wangechi, the Founder of Digital Rurals; and David Iribagiza, a Programme Manager at WOUGNET.
Spyware Threatens Civic Space and Feminist Activism in Uganda: A Growing Crisis of Surveillance, Intimidation, and Suppression
The discussions revealed alarming insights into how spyware is increasingly being used in Uganda, often by both public and private agencies, to target civil society organisations (CSOs), journalists, and feminist activists. The implications of this surveillance extend beyond just privacy violations, affecting the very fabric of civic space and the ability of feminist groups to organise and advocate effectively.
Surveillance and Intimidation: Spyware, used by both state and non-state actors, has significantly impacted civic space in Uganda by enabling intrusive surveillance of activists, journalists, and feminist organisers. This surveillance creates an environment of fear and intimidation, discouraging individuals from participating in advocacy activities. For example, feminist activists who organise online campaigns or mobilise protests may find themselves targeted by spyware, leading to the exposure of private communications and strategies. This kind of exposure not only violates privacy but also compromises the online and physical safety of activists, potentially leading to harassment, arrests, or other forms of retaliation.
Suppression of Feminist Voices: Spyware can be used to monitor and censor feminist content online. By infiltrating devices or accounts, spyware can be used to delete posts, alter communications, or disrupt the organisation of events. This undermines the efforts of feminist groups to advocate for women’s rights, as it limits their ability to freely communicate and organise. For instance, a feminist group planning to launch a campaign against gender-based violence might find their communications intercepted or disrupted, weakening the campaign’s impact and reach.
Erosion of Trust Within Movements: The presence of spyware within activist networks can lead to paranoia and mistrust among members. When activists suspect that their communications may be monitored, it can create divisions within groups, weakening collective action. In Uganda, where feminist organising often relies on strong interpersonal networks and solidarity, the erosion of trust can be particularly damaging. This mistrust can lead to the breakdown of alliances, reduced collaboration, and the eventual disintegration of movements.
Legal and Financial Consequences: Activists whose devices have been compromised by spyware may find themselves vulnerable to legal action. Information obtained through spyware can be used to build cases against activists, leading to arrests, trials, and even imprisonment. Additionally, spyware can be used to steal financial information, leading to the depletion of resources that are critical for sustaining feminist organising. In Uganda, where resources for civil society are already limited, such financial sabotage can cripple organisations and reduce their capacity to operate.
Chilling Effect on Digital Activism: The pervasive threat of spyware has a chilling effect on digital activism, particularly among women and marginalised groups who are already at greater risk of violence and harassment. Knowing that their online activities might be monitored or used against them, many activists may choose to self-censor or withdraw from digital spaces altogether. This not only limits the reach and impact of feminist organising but also silences critical voices that are essential for challenging oppressive systems and advocating for gender equality.
Legal Frameworks and Surveillance: A Double-Edged Sword
Angela Minayo opened the discussion by addressing the legal ambiguities surrounding the use of spyware in Africa. She emphasised that while the right to privacy is not absolute, any infringement on this right must be legally justified, typically for reasons such as national security or public interest. However, in practice, these legal frameworks are often exploited, allowing governments to surveil critical voices and dissenters under the guise of national security.
Minayo highlighted that in East Africa, many laws governing cyberspace are focused on “computer misuse,” a broad term that often serves as a catch-all for various forms of digital surveillance. She noted that while there are procedures for obtaining court orders for surveillance, these are frequently bypassed or manipulated, leading to widespread abuse.
The Ugandan Perspective: A Case Study in Unchecked Surveillance
David Iribagiza brought the discussion closer to home by detailing the situation in Uganda, where spyware has been used extensively against activists and feminists. He noted that despite the widespread use of surveillance technologies, there is a glaring lack of research and documentation on the subject. This lack of data not only hinders efforts to understand the scope of the problem but also leaves activists and CSOs vulnerable, with little to no resources to combat these invasions of privacy.
Esther Nyapendi echoed Iribagiza’s concerns, emphasising the need for localised research that reflects the unique challenges faced by African countries. She pointed out that much of the existing knowledge and legal frameworks are borrowed from Western contexts, which may not be entirely applicable in Africa. Nyapendi called for a concerted effort to document cases of spyware use in Uganda and other African nations, creating a body of evidence that can be used to advocate for more appropriate and effective policies.
Feminist Organizing Under Surveillance: Challenges and Resilience
The impact of spyware on feminist organising was a critical focus of the workshop. Tabitha Wangechi discussed how surveillance has created an environment of fear and mistrust among activists, making it difficult to mobilise and organise. Feminist groups, which often work on sensitive issues such as gender-based violence and women’s rights, are particularly vulnerable to such tactics.
Wangechi emphasised that the threat of surveillance is not just theoretical; it has real, tangible effects on the ground. Activists are forced to take extreme precautions, including using encrypted communications and avoiding certain digital tools altogether. However, these measures can only go so far, and the psychological toll of constant surveillance cannot be understated.
The Need for Digital Security and Accountability
The panellists agreed that while digital security measures, such as using virtual private networks (VPNs), encryption, and antivirus software, are essential, they are not foolproof solutions. Angela Minayo pointed out that there is a significant asymmetry of power between state actors and individual activists. Even with the best digital security practices, activists are often at the mercy of state surveillance, which can be relentless and invasive.
The discussion also touched on the role of spyware manufacturers and the need for greater accountability in the surveillance technology industry. Minayo argued that companies selling these tools should be held to higher human rights standards, especially when selling to countries with poor human rights records.
Conclusion: The Road Ahead
The workshop concluded with a call to action. The panellists urged for more research, better legal frameworks, and stronger digital security practices. However, they also acknowledged that these measures alone are not enough. There needs to be a broader societal and political shift towards recognizing and protecting the rights of activists, journalists, and feminists who are often the first targets of surveillance.
In Uganda and across Africa, the fight against spyware is not just about protecting individual privacy; it is about safeguarding the very foundations of civic space and the ability of marginalised groups to organise, advocate, and resist. As the discussions at DataFest Africa 2024 made clear, this is a battle that must be fought on multiple fronts, with vigilance, resilience, and solidarity.
Compiled by
Esther Nyapendi, WOUGNET
